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ARABY REVISITED: THE EVOLVING CONCEPT
OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS BEFORE LAND
USE REGULATORY BODIES
Edward J. Sullivan*
INTRODUCTION

Procedural due process in hearings before local governmental authorities is ,the most uncertain area of modern municipal
law. A re-examination of what accurately can be described as
the greatest source of public discontent in land use regulationprocedural due process in hearings before land-use regulatory
bodies-is necessary in view of the increase in public control over
the private use of land.
This article will describe the problem of providing a fair
hearing before lay tribunals which pass on land-use questions.
Further, it will analyze the development of judicial response to
that problem. Finally, the article will consider recent responses
to the problem by the American Law Institute and various appellate courts, and will suggest workable solutions for the future.
The principal focal point of this article is the judicial distinction drawn between "legislative" and "quasi-judicial" land-use decisions. This distinction ultimately has permitted many courts to
tolerate the lack of procedural standards in land-use regulation.
Despite academic recognition of the general lack of adequate procedural standards, there continues to be a virtual procedural void
in most hearings before land-use regulatory bodies. This article,
by examining the nature of the land-use regulatory process, will
offer a method of providing those procedural reforms so long
overdue.

I.

THE "LEGISLATIVE" NATURE OF ZONING REGULATIONSWHAT'S IN A NAME?

The history of land-use regulation in the United States cannot
*
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be separated from the climate which spawned it. The first comprehensive zoning ordinance was enacted in New York City in
1916.' During the 1920's there was a substantial increase in the
use of zoning as a land planning device, 2 especially in the urban-

ized areas. Zoning was encouraged by realtors and homeowners
who saw it as the means of preserving the pinnacle of the Ameri-

can Dream-the single family home. The movement for increased zoning was facilitated by the preparation of two model
acts by the United States Department of Commerce under its Secretary, Herbert Hoover: the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act 3 and the Standard City Planning Enabling Act.4 Finally, the

effort was crowned with success in 1926 when a conservative
United States Supreme Court upheld the concept of private land

use regulation by public agencies in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.5
The two Standard Acts were adopted by many states.6 Unfortunately the Acts failed 'to specify clear procedural standards
to be used by local governing bodies in making land-use decisions;
thus implementation of the Acts was difficult. The Standard State

Zoning Enabling Act did specify certain strict procedural standards to be followed by local boards of adjustment 7 in their consideration of applications for variances' and special exceptions. 9
The Standard City Planning Enabling Act, however, imposed few

procedural restrictions on the actions of planning commissions,'0

and the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act placed virtually no
1. NEW YORK, N.Y., BUILDING ZONE ORDINANCE (July 25, 1916). The ordinance was upheld in Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313,
128 N.E. 209 (1920).
2. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.11 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]; ANDERSON E. ROswEIG, PLANNING, ZONING, SUBDIVISION: A SUMMARY OF STATUTORY LAW IN THE 50 STATES (1966); Zoning Progress in the United States, 13 A.B.A.J. 547 (1927).
3. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (rev.
ed. 1926) [hereinafter cited as ZONING ENABLING ACT]. The Act is reprinted in
full in ANDERSON, supra note 2, at § 26.01.
4. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT
(rev. ed. 1928) [hereinafter cited as CITY PLANNING ENABLING AT].
5. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300-02, 65600-701, 65800-51 (West
1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-13-1 to -19, 34-3151 to -3161 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10601 et seq. (Purdon 1972).
7. ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 3, at § 7.
8. A variance is "an authorization for the construction or maintenance of
a building structure, or for the establishment or maintenance of a use of land,
which is prohibited by a zoning ordinance." ANDERSON, supra note 2, at § 14.02.
9. The special exception involves a use which is "permitted rather than proscribed by the zoning regulations." Such a use is allowed only upon the approval
of the board of adjustment or another similar administrative body. Id. § 15.01.
10. CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT, supra note 4, at § 8 (requiring only
newspaper notice and a single hearing before adoption).
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restrictions on the decision-making process of the local legislative
bodies."
The board of adjustment, planning commission and local
legislative body of a city perform different functions in 'the process
of regulating land use. Applications for variances and special exceptions usually are heard and decided by the board of adjustment.12 Traditionally, these decisions by the board have been
classified as "quasi-judicial" in nature.' 3 Applications for zoning
ordinance amendments are heard by the planning commission,
which makes recommendations on the applications to the local
legislative body.' 4 These recommendations are reviewed by the
legislative body, which generally holds a public hearing on the
proposed rezoning." A rezoning decision by a local legislative
body traditionally has been deemed to be a "legislative" act.'"
The assumption that land-use decisions by the local legislative body are "legislative" -acts, subject to reversal by a court only
if clearly arbitrary, 1'7 has led many state legislatures ,to forego requiring these local bodies to meet strict procedural standards in
their public hearings. In addition, this "legislative" classification
of certain local land-use decisions has retarded the growth of a
body of land-use law addressing the procedural rights of parties
before land-use regulatory bodies. Indeed, until recently, the
courts have struck down few such decisions on procedural
grounds.'
While the courts and the commentators repeatedly
have expressed their concern over the lack of procedural standards, 19 the legislatures have failed to answer the call for statutory
guidance.
A.

The Scope of JudicialReview

In most of the early cases, the chief concern of the courts
when reviewing land-use regulations, was whether the regulation
was for the benefit of the "public health, safety, morals and gen11. ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 3, at § 4. This section specifically
refers to the "legislative body" of municipalities having the sole power to adopt,
amend or change zoning regulations.
12. D. HAGMAN, J. LARSON & C. MARTIN, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE 425

(1969) [hereinafter cited as ZONING PRACTICE].
13. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text infra.
14. ZONING PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 424.

15. Id. at 426.
16. See, e.g., Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71

(1958); Richter v. Board of Supervisors, 259 Cal. App. 2d 99, 66 Cal. Rptr. 52
(1968).
17. See, e.g., Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38
(1949).

18. ZONING PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 255.
19. See text accompanying notes 44-98 infra.
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eral welfare." 2
The "general welfare" standard, however,
proved to be too vague. Lacking a clear standard, many courts
became frustrated in their attempts to review land-use regulations. As a result, courts adopted the rule that if the reasonable-

ness of an ordinance was "fairly debatable" the ordinance would

be upheld. 21 This rule has been used by the courts in their re-

view of both initial zoning regulations 22 and later modifications
of these regulations.23

The courts generally have been reluotant to review local
"legislative" land-use decisions. The reluctance of the courts to
scrutinize closely these local decisions is attributable to various

factors.

In reviewing local actions, the courts, in effect, were

guided only by the permissible limits of the local police power.
These limits were never clearly defined and thus the courts were

left with little real guidance. In addition, the courts were faced
with the vague language of the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act, which mandated that land-use regulations be in accordance

with a comprehensive plan.24 This mandate proved to be con-

fusing since courts25 and legal commentators 26 were in disagreement as to what should be the content of the comprehensive plan.
Further, the term "legislative" as applied to the rezoning decisions

of local governments hindered any substantive judicial review of
these decisions. In general, any zoning ordinance or amendment
to a zoning ordinance passed by a local legislative body was sustained by the courts if there was any reasonable justification for
20. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Miller
v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925); Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 P. 99 (1923); Building Inspector v. Stoklosa, 250 Mass.
52, 145 N.E. 262 (1924); Kroner v. City of Portland, 116 Ore. 141, 240 P. 536
(1925).
21. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 522, 370 P.2d
342, 347, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 643 (1962); McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach,
41 Cal. 2d 879, 886, 264 P.2d 932, 935 (1953); Lockard v. City of Los Angeles,
33 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 202 P.2d 38, 43 (1949).
22. See ANDERSON, supra note 2, at § 2.16.
23. See, e.g., Barry v. Town of Glenville, 9 App. Div. 2d 822, 192 N.Y.S.2d
845 (1959), aff'd on other grounds, 8 N.Y.2d 1153, 171 N.E.2d 907, 209 N.Y.S.
2d 834 (1960); Stevens v. Town of Huntington, 46 Misc. 2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d
96 (1965).
24. ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 3, at § 3.
25. Compare Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d
1 (1957), and Fairlawns Cemetery Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 138 Conn. 434, 86
A.2d 74 (1952), with Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.
2d 888 (1968), and Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs of Wash. County, 264
Ore. 547, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
26. See, e.g., Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan", 68 HARV.
.L. REV. 1154 (1955); Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20
LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 353 (1955); Perry, The Local "General Plan" in California, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1971); Note, The Comprehensive Plan Require-.
ment In Zoning, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 342 (1961).

SANTA

it."

CLARA LAWYER

[Vol. 15

As legislative acts, zoning ordinances and amendments en-

joyed a presumption of validity and those attacking these regulations had the burden of proving them invalid 28 -often a difficult, if not impossible, task.29
Thus, the "legislative" classification given to zoning and rezoning actions has, in effect, provided the courts with a reason to
refrain from thoroughly reviewing such actions. As a result, the
courts have given little attention to the problem of the lack of

adequate procedural standards in hearings on proposed zoning
changes.
B.

The Lack of ProceduralStandards

Despite the lack of procedural standards in hearings before
local legislative bodies, it was the procedural deficiencies of appointed -administrative bodies, such as the board of adjustmentnot elected legislative bodies-that drew most of the fire from

the critics. Under the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, authority
to rule on variance applications normally was delegated to an appointed board of adjustment. This board was characterized by
27. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Vickers v.
Township Comm'n of Glouster Township, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
28. See, e.g., Vickers v. Township Comm'n of Glouster Township, 37 N.J.
232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233
(1963). In Vickers, the court explained the effect of the presumption as follows:
"The court cannot pass upon the wisdom or unwisdom of an ordinance, but may
act only if the presumption in favor of the validity of the ordinance is overcome
by an affirmative showing that it is unreasonable or arbitrary." Id. at 242, 181
A.2d at 134. Because the plaintiff failed to show beyond debate that the ordinance was unreasonable or arbitrary, the ordinance was upheld.
29. The characterization of zoning and rezoning decisions as "legislative" has
had other consequences. For one, only the local "legislative body" may act upon
the same. ZONING ENABLING AcT, supra note 3, at § 4. For another, the initiative may be used, but often only after the notice and hearing requirements for
rezoning have been met. Compare Meridian Dev. Co. v. Edison Township,
91 N.J. Super. 310, 220 A.2d 121 (1966), with Hancock v. Rouse, 437 S.W.2d
1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). The better line of cases holds that small tract rezoning
is not a true "legislative" act but "administrative" in nature and cannot be the
subject of initiative. Kelly v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956); Foreman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973);
Smith v. Township of Livingston, 106 N.J. Super. 444, 256 A.2d 85, a!f'd, 54 N.J.
525, 257 A.2d 698 (1969). See also Comment, Zoning by Initiative to Satisfy
Local Electorates: A Valid Approach in California?, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 105
(1973); Comment, Voter Zoning: Direct Legislation and Municipal Planning,
1969 LAw & Soc. ORDER 453; Note, 1971 U. OF TOLEDO L. REV. 448. A third
consequence is the use of the referendum, allowed in most states. Witkin Homes,
Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 31 Colo. App. 410, 504 P.2d 1121 (1973);
Denney v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 202 N.W.2d 892 (1972).
However,
the legislative-administrative distinction is making inroads. In West v. City of
Portage, - Mich. -, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974), the Michigan Supreme Court used
the distinction to disallow a referendum on a rezoning. See also Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1974).
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the courts as an administrative body rendering "quasi-judicial"
rather than legislative decisions. As a quasi-judicial body its procedure was more circumscribed than that of a legislative entity.
The Standard Zoning Enabling Act specified the procedure
to be followed by the board of adjustment.3" The Act entrusted
the chairman of the board with the right to compel attendance
of witnesses and administer oaths during a meeting of the board.3"
Under the Act all meetings of -the board were to be open to ,the
public and minutes of its proceedings were to be kept by the
board, showing the vote of each member on each question.3 2 The
board was to have the power to review certain administrative decisions and grant special exceptions and variances. In exercising
this power the Act required the board to hold public hearings,
after giving public notice 'and due notice to the parties in interest.
Any party could appear at the hearing in person or by agent or
attorney.3" The decision of the board could be judicially reviewed if ithe court were petitioned within thirty days following
the filing of the board's ruling.34 Compared to the sections of
the Act relating to "legislative" actions, which usually required
only notice 'and an opportunity to be heard, 5 section seven of the
Act created only limited potential for abuse of discretion by a
board of adjustment.
Despite the restrictive nature of the procedural requirements, however, the boards often granted variances when they
were inappropriate.3 6 Such actions frequently resulted from the
board members allowing their personal beliefs to take precedence
over procedural requirements. Deference to personal beliefs was
especially prevalent when there was no voiced opposition to the
30. ZONING ENABLING Acr, supra note 3, at § 7. See the detailed procedure
applicable to the Philadelphia Board of Adjustment in Note, Zoning Variances
and Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 516, 523-29
(1955). See also ALI, MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 2-301, 2-304, Note,
at 82-85, 92-95 (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, Tent. Draft No. 6, App. A,
1974) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE]; See also McSwain, The Zoning Board
of Adjustment, 13 BAYLOR L. REV. 21 (1961); Yokely, The Place of the Planning
Commission and Zoning Board of Adjustment in Community Life, 8 VAND. L.
REV. 794, 798-801 (1955) [hereinafter cited as YOKELY].
31. ZONING ENABLING AcT, supra note 3, at § 7.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id., §§ 4, 5. Note that Section 4 required a public hearing "at which
parties in interest and citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard" and at least
15 days notice given in a local newspaper of general circulation. However, if
more than 20% of the landowners within a given area protest, Section 5 provided
that a three-fourths affirmative vote of all the members could be required for the
change.
36. Dukenminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case
Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273 (1962); Yokely, supra note 30, at 803.
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particular variance application. In addition, the improper granting of variances often was the result of a lack of adequate substantive standards. Boards continued to base their decision to
grant or deny a variance on the traditional consideration of
whether the existing zoning of the subject property created "practical difficulties" or "unnecessary hardships" for the landowner
applying for the variance.17 These general standards of "practical
difficulties" and "unnecessary hardship" provided the boards with
little guidance. Thus, despite the detailed procedural standards
applicable to board actions, the practices of the local boards were
not in any way comparable to those of a traditional administrative
agency, and for this reason such praotices were frequently the subject of criticism. 3 s
While strong criticism of the procedural deficiencies of administrative bodies was common, few attempts were made to
remedy the procedural void in hearings before local legislative
bodies. The procedural aspects of regulatory actions by local governments were left untouched because of the "legislative" character of these actions.3 " While some form of notice and an opportunity to be heard were required in hearings before legislative
bodies, municipal legislatures, in general, tended to be insensitive
to most due process rights. For example, many individuals were
allowed to make their views on a land-use matter known to the
local body, but some views were permitted to carry greater weight
than others.4 0 In addition, the fact that an individual participated
in the local proceedings was no guarantee that the same individual
would be found by a court to have standing if he later sought a
judicial review of the local decision. Further, the motives of the
"legislative" body could not be challenged 4 except in the most
37. Reps, DiscretionaryPowers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAw AND
PROB. 280 (1955); Anderson, The Board of Zoning Appeals, Villain
or Victim?, 13 SYRACUSE L. REv. 353 (1962); Mandelker, Delegation of Power
and Function in Zoning Administration, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 60 [hereinafter cited
as Mandelker].
38. Mandelker, supra note 37; Comment, Judicial Controls over Zoning
Boards of Appeal: Suggestions for Reform, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 937 (1965).
39. Mandelker, supra note 37, at 85-86. Professor Mandelker strongly urges
an end to the nominalism which distinguishes judicial review of rezoning from
other land use controls from a substantive viewpoint in THE ZONING DItLMMA
70-77, 83-84 (1971).
Economy Wholesale Co. v. Rodgers, 232 Ark. 835, 340
S.W.2d 583 (1960); see 4 M Club, Inc. v. Andrews, 11 App. Div. 2d 720, 204
N.Y.S.2d 610 (1960); Charleston Home Ass'n, Inc. v. LaCoke, 507 S.W.2d 876
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
40. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.

CONTEMP.

41. In Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 569 (1960), the use of the "legislative" label is
seen to preclude inquiry into a rezoning action, even in those cases involving financial gain to a member of the zoning body. See, however, notes 97-98 and
accompanying text infra discussing the judicially created "appearance of fairness"

rule. In Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 694 (1966), a stricter position is utilized in more

1974]

LAND USE REGULATORY BODIES

egregious circumstances,4 2 and, since "legislation" did not require

a record or articulated justification, the courts often were left with
the unenviable job of ex-post-facto justification.4 3
Thus, because of the "legislative" classification given deci-

sions by local legislatures, the lack of due process rights in hearings before these bodies was tolerated. Only recently have courts
begun to re-examine the validity of this "legislative" label.
II.

FIRST EFFORTS TO COPE WITH THE
LEGISLATIVE DESIGNATION

The "quasi-judicial"-"legislative" distinction became a fetish
with the courts. Both courts and legal commentators were critical of the quasi-judicial decisions rendered by boards of adjustment, and were solicitous of the rights of parties appearing before
such bodies.4 4 The courts, however, found themselves with
limited power to overturn those decisions which were labelled
"legislative."
Most courts were not clear as to the nature of various landuse decisions. The distinctions between "legislative" and "quasi-.
judicial" decisions remained vague. As a result, the courts found
themselves unable to develop basic procedural requirements to be
met by local land-use regulatory bodies.
The courts' inability to review effectively land-use decisions
was reflected in various ways. One commentator has observed
that the Illinois Supreme Court seemed to have only one end in
mind when reviewing land-use regulations-to reduce the number
recent cases in which "administrative officials" act in a "judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity." But see City of Miami Beach v. Schauer, 104 So. 2d 129 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1958), cert. denied, 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1959); Coffin v. City of Lee's
Summit, 357 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); Burford v. City of Austin, 379
S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 188 Va.
97, 49 S.E.2d 321 (1948).
42. Perhaps the most ludicrous of the "motive" cases is DeSena v. Guide, 24
App. Div. 2d 165, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1965) in which a black neighborhood was
zoned for light manufacturing by the Hempstead, N.Y., Zoning Ordinance. After
picketing and demonstrations, however, the zone designation was changed to reflect a residential classification. The Mayor read a statement into the record at
the public hearing on the rezoning stating that the reclassification was due to
threats of violence. The court in reviewing the rezoning reversed the reclassification by finding the motive behind the rezoning unacceptable and carving out an
exception to the general rule that a court will not inquire into the legislative motives. The result was that the blacks were once again in the industrial area. See
Comment, Legislative Motive in Enacting Zoning Ordinance May Be Examined
When Disclosed in Record of Public Hearing: The Exception Swallows the Rule,
17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 687 (1966).
43. Hlavati v. Board of Adjustment, 142 Conn. 659, 116 A.2d 504 (1955);
see also Charleston Home Ass'n, Inc. v. LaCoke, 507 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974).
44. See note 36 supra.
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of land-use decisions to come before the court.4 5 He added that
the court
may in its decisions speak of "principles" but there is persuasive evidence that the court has convenient braces of zoning
axioms, one of each pair useful whenever the court has concluded that the facts favor the municipality, the other when
the court interprets the facts sympathetically to the land46
owner.
The same commentator has quoted one jurist as saying that he
based his decisions regarding land-use matters on "gut instinct."4 7
This quotation illustrates -the sorry state to which land-use law had
fallen.
Out of these ashes arose the seeds of a reconceptualization
of the land-use regulatory process. Ironically, the first thoughts
on this subject originated with the "legislative"-"quasi-judicial"
dichotomy which distinguished the rezoning function undertaken
by the local governing body from the variance and special permit
granting functions undertaken by the board of adjustment under
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act. The courts and legal
writers had long termed proceedings of the board of adjustment
in granting variances, correcting errors of administrative officers,
and issuing special exception permits as "quasi-judicial" acts of
an administrative agency. 48 By using this characterization, the
courts indicated that although the board of adjustment was not a
formal judicial tribunal, it was required to follow a rule of "fundamental fairness" in its proceedings. 49 This rule countenanced not
only a requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard, but also
a right to have legal counsel present, to cross-examine opponents,
and to have the board utilize its power to administer oaths 'and
subpoena witnesses."
45. Babcock, The

Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in Illinois,

26 U. Cm. L. REv. 509, 532 (1959).
46. Id. at 533.
47. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 106 (1966)

[hereinafter cited as BAB-

COCK].

48. Originally, the stability to be provided by the zoning pattern was emphasized. The few decisions which would have to be made (for example, the granting
of a variance to avoid a "taking" claim and the granting of a special permit or

conditional use relating to inherently benign uses, such as churches and schools)
were geared to low visibility. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA (1971).

See also Note, Zoning-A Comprehensive Study of Problems and Solutions, 14

N.Y.L.F. 76, 114-17 (1968); Potts v. Board of Adjustmeni of Borough of Princeton, 133 N.J.L. 230, 43A.2d 850 (1945); Beach v. Board of Adjustment, 73 Wash.
2d 343, 348 P.2d 617 (1968).

49. See Parsons v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 290, 99 A.2d 149
(1953); Daly v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 150 Conn. 495, 191 A.2d 250
(1963); Hopf v. Board of Review, 102 R.I. 275, 230 A.2d 420 (1967).
50. See note 48 supra. See also M. LEARY, "ZONING" IN PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES OF URBAN PLANNING

440-41 (1968).
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Slowly, the distinctions between actions taken by a board of
adjustment and local legislative bodies began to break down.
Commentators began to urge judicial establishment of a more
functional distinction between the older "legislative" and "quasijudicial" categories based on the administrative law distinctions
between rule-making and adjudication.5 1
Moreover, writers began to question the distinctions traditionally made between a variance or special exception granted by
the board of adjustment, and a rezoning decision by the local
legislative body. Many commentators found the distinction to be
a matter of form rather than substance.52 A uniform approach
was urged for all exercises of the land-use regulatory power.
A.

A Break With the Past

There were indications that the courts were heeding the writers who urged reconceptualization, but few courts were willing to
make a clean break with the past. New Jersey5 3 and Oregon 4
were among the first states to treat small-tract rezonings as
quasi-judicial acts, stripped of their legislative cloak.
In Aldom v. Borough of Roseland the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the action of the local governing body in amending
a zoning ordinance was not exclusively legislative.5 5 The court
noted that review of a purely legislative act of a local government was beyond its power except where the act evidenced a
"clear perversion of power."56 The Aldom court found, however,
that the rezoning by the council in the instant case 57
was quasi-judicial in nature and thus was subject to judicial review.
In Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of Washington
County,5" the Oregon Supreme Court also held a rezoning action
by the county board of commissioners to be judicial rather than
legislative in nature. 9 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt,60 adopted a rationale similar to
that used by the Fasano court. In Pruitt the court distinguished
the adoption of a comprehensive zoning scheme from a decision to
51. Mignone, Some Special Problems in the Law of Zoning, 42 CONN. B.J.
183 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Mignone].
52. See note 39 supra.
53. Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. 495, 127 A.2d 190 (1956).
54. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'n, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
55. 42 N.J. Super. 495, 127 A.2d 190 (1956).
56. Id. at 508, 127 A.2d at 197.
57. Id.
58. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). See also West v. City of Portage,
-

Mich. -,

221 N.W.2d 303 (1974).

59. See text accompanying notes 100-17 infra.
60. 482 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1973).
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rezone a specific tract of land. The court found the enactment
of the overall zoning scheme to be legislative in nature and the
rezoning decision to be judicial in nature."' The court concluded
that,
distinguished from the legislative action of adopting a comprehensive zoning plan, the adjudicative decision inherent in
tract rezoning requires the decision maker to adhere to concepts of minimal due process. [cases omitted] Here, appellants' complaint alleged the rezoning of the property had been
denied by the Commissioners without a statement of their
reasons and by recourse to evidence which was not in the
record. 62 Such administrative action has long been condemned.
Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court also found a city
council decision on a rezoning to be quasi-judicial in nature. 3
The court, however, made no determination as to the procedural
requirements to be met in a rezoning hearing. In addition, the
Hawaii Supreme Court, in Town v. Land Use Commission,64 recently found that the action of the State Land Use Commission,
which had sole jurisdiction in the matter, in changing the classification of land from "agricultural" to "rural" was subject to the
Hawaii Administrative Procedures Act and would be judged by
the standards for adjudication, rather than rule-making.
Thus, some courts have been willing, in certain situations,
to discard the "legislative" label usually attached to actions by
local governing bodies. This willingness, however, remains a distinct minority position.
Most courts have been unwilling to treat rezoning decisions
as quasi-judicial acts. However, these courts have created various
methods of judicially controlling local "legislative" power, especially in the area of rezoning.65
61. Id. at 391.
62. Id. Unfortunately the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, on its own motion, chose to have the case reheard en banc. South Gwinnet Venture v. Pruitt,
487 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1973). With Judges Ingraham and Wisdom dissenting,
the court reversed itself, affirming the District Court opinion that it was not the
function of the federal court to serve as a zoning appeals board. The Circuit
Court found that the decision of the zoning board was of a legislative character
and therefore no due process rights had been violated. South Gwinnet Venture
v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1974). On April 1, 1974, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Pruitt v. South Gwinnett Venture, 94 S. Ct. 1625
(1974).
63. City of Colorado Springs v. District Court, 519 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1974).
64. 524 P.2d 84 (Hawaii 1974).
65. Not only have courts created methods of controlling rezoning, but some
local governments also have established their own methods of restricting rezoning
activities. Such restrictions have been established through the use of contract and
conditional zoning. Contract zoning occurs when a city enters into a direct contract with a developer to rezone certain property upon the understanding that the
property will be put to a particular use within a certain time. D. HAGMAN, PUB-
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The change or mistake rule. The change or mistake rule

has been forged by the judiciary in an attempt to check arbitrary
use of the zoning power through the use of substantive rather than
procedural safeguards. 66

The rule, in brief, provides that no re-

zoning can be accomplished without proof of a change in the physical character of the neighborhood to be rezoned or a mistake in
the original zoning.6 7 This rule, especially prevalent in Maryland,
has provided the judiciary with a means of overturning a rezoning

decision despite its strong presumption of legislative validity.
Courts which have adopted this rule refuse to uphold rezoning
decisions where there is a failure to show a change or mistake.'
It should be noted that the rule has been criticized for exalting

older "legislation" over subsequent amendatory action.69

Weakened presumption of validity. The courts also have
begun to re-examine early decisions which upheld land-use de-

cisions of local governments in almost carte-blanche fashion. Circumstances have arisen under which courts have found the full

presumption of legislative validity to be inapplicable. For example, where a court which has adopted the change or mistake
rule finds that a local legislative body has rezoned property where
there has been no change in the character of the neighborhood

and no mistake in -the original zoning, the court usually does not
uphold the rezoning despite the traditional presumption of validity.7" In addition, courts have refused to apply the presumption
where a rezoning appears to be spot zoning, 7 ' or where a rezoning

LIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT, CASES AND MA-

454 (1973).
Conditional zoning is somewhat similar to contract zoning.
This type of zoning is enacted by an ordinance which makes its effective
date not the usual thirty days from the date of adoption, but upon the
performance of certain conditions such as the dedication of property,
Id. Courts are not in complete agreement as to the validity of contract and conditional zoning. Compare Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d
432 (1971), with Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79
Gradually, however, conditional zoning, and to a lesser
Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
extent, contract zoning have been accepted by the courts. State ex rel. Zupancic
v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970). See Strine, Use of Conditions in Land Use Control, 67 DICK. L. REv. 109 (1963).
66. Another method of checking the abuses of zoning boards is the judiciallycarved exception to the rule for "floating zones." Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957).
67. ANDERSON, supra note 2, at § 5.03; Linowes & Delaney, The Maryland
Change or Mistake Rule: A Mistake That Should Be Changed, LAND USE CONTRoIs ANNUAL (American Society of Planning Officials 1971).
68. See, e.g., Heller v. Prince George's County, 264 Md. 410, 286 A.2d 772
(1972) (no evidence of change of conditions).
69. See the excellent history and critique of the rule in the dissenting opinion
of Judge Barnes in MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 210
A.2d 325 (1965).
70. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
71. See Magnin v. Zoning Comm'n of Madison, 145 Conn. 26, 138 A.2d 522
TE1RUSL
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is not supported by an existing comprehensive plan. 72 Further,

where there is a failure to provide for "preferred uses" 78 or where
the zoning is exclusionary, 74 some courts have found the presump-

tion of validity to be inapplicable.
B.

Movement Toward ProceduralSafeguards

Many courts have been requiring, on a case-by-case basis,
more and more procedural safeguards in all land-use regulatory
proceedings.75 The due process rights of notice and an opportunity to be heard always have been required in both legislative and

quasi-judicial proceedings.

Some courts also have held that par-

ties should be allowed to cross-examine witnesses in hearings before local zoning authorities. 70 It should be noted, however, that

the courts usually allow such cross-examination only in administrative or quasi-judicial hearings.77
The lack of any written findings by the local legislative body
often has made it difficult for the judiciary to give adequate re(1958); Roseta v. County of Washington, 254 Ore. 161, 458 P.2d 405 (1969);
Smith v. County of Washington, 241 Ore. 380, 406 P.2d 545 (1965). Spot zoning
usually occurs when a small parcel of land is subjected to more or less restrictive
zoning than the surrounding properties. The term "spot zoning," however, is
charged with emotion and highly subjective in its application.
72. Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 111.App. 3d
230, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1974); Raabe v. City of Walker, 383 Mich. 165, 174 N.W.
2d 789 (1970).
73. Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955);
Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971). In
Bristow the court explained that certain uses of land, such as uses for educational
or religious purposes, have come to be recognized as "bearing a real, substantial,
and beneficial relationship to the public health, safety and welfare so as to be
afforded a preferred or favored status." Id. at 210, 192 N.W.2d at 324. The "preferred use" doctrine is as peculiar to Michigan as the "change or mistake" doctrine
is to Maryland. The doctrine was recently abruptly overruled in Kropf v. City
of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974).
74. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 119
N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (1972); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa.
466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970);
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Sager,
Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21
STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Comment, The General Public Interest v. The Presumption of Zoning Ordinance Validity: A Debatable Question, 50 J. URBAN LAW
129, 134 (1972). Exclusionary zoning is said to occur when a particular use or
uses are completely excluded from a community.
75. See Comment, Zoning Amendments: The Product of Judicial or QuasiJudicial Action, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130 (1972), relied upon by the Oregon Supreme
Court in Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 547, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
76. See Annot. 27 A.L.R.3d 1304 (1969).
Cross-examination was found to
be a requirement in Jenner v. City Council of Covina, 164 Cal. App. 2d 490,
331 P.2d 176 (1958); Flagstad v. City of San Mateo, 156 Cal. App. 2d 138, 318
P.2d 825 (1958); and Jackson v. City of San Mateo, 148 Cal. App. 2d 667, 307
P.2d 451 (1957).
77. See Annot. 27 A.L.R.3d 1304 (1969).
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view to decisions made by such a body. 78 Thus, many courts have
required that the local bodies make written records of their find-

ings.

79

In addition, the judiciary has refused to stand idle while local
zoning authorities fail to accord the parties -any semblance of pro-

cedural fairness.8 0 Even when the decision being reviewed is one
traditionally classified as "legislative," the courts often refuse to
uphold the decision if the local authority has committed gross procedural error .8 In Ford v. Baltimore County,"2 the county council

adopted a new comprehensive zoning plan which eliminated the
business zoning on a certain tract of property and placed the prop-

erty in a residential zone."8 The public hearing on the proposed
zoning change was described by the court 'as "in reality no hearing
at all but rather a rowdy and uncontrolled mob ...
"84
The
court noted that when a hearing is required "it must be -a fair hearing in all respects and not a mere form."8 The evidence showed
that, because of the conditions surrounding the "hearing," the ap-

pellants were never "heard" by the council in regard to their opposition to the proposed zoning change.8 6 Thus, the court held
that the subsequent action by the Council was void for failure to
78. The Oregon Supreme Court in Roseta v. County of Washington, 254 Ore.
161, 170, 450 P.2d 405, 410 (1969) expressed its reasoning as follows:
Since we cannot properly exercise our function of judicial review without a record of adequate findings by the board or the Planning Commission on which it based its decision to allow a change of use within a
zone, it is within our province to require such findings as an essential
part of the Board's procedure.
79. See, e.g., Robey v. Schwab, 307 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Dietrich v.
District of Columbia Bd. of Adjustment, 293 A.2d 470 (D.C. App. 1972); Roseta
v. County of Washington, 254 Ore. 161, 458 P.2d 405 (1969); West v. City of
Astoria, 524 P.2d 1216 (Ore. App. 1974); McClellan v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 8
Pa. Cmwlth. 537, 304 A.2d 520 (1973); Miernyk v. Board of Zoning Appeals,
181 S.E.2d 681 (W. Va. 1971); Schelley v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 8 Pa.
Cmwlth. 169, 302 A.2d 526 (1973); B.J.M. Development Corp. v. Fayette County
Zoning Hearing Bd., 1 Pa. Cmwlth. 534, 275 A.2d 714 (1971); Melucci v. Zoning
Bd. of Review, 226 A.2d 416 (R.I. 1967); Braun v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 99
R.I. 105, 206 A.2d 96 (1965).
In Northampton Corp. v. Prince George's
County, 21 Md. 625, 321 A.2d 204 (1974), the court found that the adoption
of a hearings officer's proposed findings was sufficient and no new findings were
required unless such a proposal was to be rejected or modified.
80. See, e.g., Ford v. Baltimore County, 268 Md. 172, 300 A.2d 204 (1973);
Town of Lima v. Robert Slocum Enterprises, Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 503, 331
N.Y.S.2d 51 (1972); Flanders Lumber & Bldg. Supply Co. v. Town of Milton,
128 Vt. 38, 258 A.2d 804 (1969).
81. Id. In Oregon, even prior to Fasano, the appellate courts have emphasized procedural fairness even to the extent of not requiring standards for administration of legislation. Warren v. Marion County, 222 Ore. 307, 353 P.2d 257
(1960). See also K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONAdY JUsTIcE (1969).
82. 268 Md. 172, 300 A.2d 204 (1973).
83. Id. at 182, 300 A.2d at 209.
84. Id. at 192, 300 A.2d at 214.
85. Id. at 186, 300 A.2d at 211.
86. Id. at 192, 300 A.2d at 214.
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give a proper hearing.8 7
Various other procedural safeguards gradually have been in-

stituted by the courts. Even while not adopting the quasi-judicial
model, many courts have begun viewing the actions of local government in a more realistic and practical manner. To facilitate
judicial review, these courts are using burdens of proof 88 and the
"substantial evidence" standard of review8" in their determination
of whether a zoning action is valid.
In addition, the courts have attempted to curb some of the
abuses which have arisen from the use of the "legislative" label

by closely reviewing rezoning actions where it is alleged that a
member of the local zoning authority was biased or his vote was
influenced by an improper motiveY0 It should be noted, however, that there have been few, if any, suggestions that pre-hearing contacts between the members of the local zoning authority
and interested parties be barred.9"
Many courts also have changed the traditional standing requirements. Under the theory that zoning actions are legislative,
only those who had suffered damages which were different in kind
from those suffered by the public were eligible to contest such

zoning actions.9 2 Recently, however, many non-residents have attempted to challenge zoning changes in jurisdictions in which they
did not even own property." As zoning ordinances often affect the property of individuals who do not live within the boundaries of the locality in which the ordinances are enacted, courts
and commentators have come to recognize that, in certain in87. Id. at 193, 300 A.2d at 214.
88. Raffia v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 151 Conn. 484, 199 A.2d 333 (1964);
Grovepac v. Metropolitan Dade County, 232 So. 2d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970); Board of County Comm'rs v. Edmonds, 240 Md. 680, 215 A.2d 209
(1965).
89. See, e.g., Kizer v. Beck, 30 Colo. App. 569, 496 P.2d 1062 (1972); Heft
v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Peonia County, 31 Ill. 2d 266, 201 N.E.2d 364
(1964); Elliott v. Joyce, 233 Md. 76, 195 A.2d 254 (1963); Stockwell v. Board
of Zoning Adjustment, 434 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); ANDERSON, supra
note 2, at § 21.17.
90. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
91. Contra, Mignone, supra note 51, at 194.
92. Ayer, The Primitive Law of Standing in Land Use Disputes: Some Notes
from a Dark Continent, 55 IowA L. REV. 344 (1969); Comment, Standing to
Appeal Zoning Determinations: The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 1070 (1966); Note, The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning,
8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 294 (1967).
93. See, e.g., Scott v. Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 745 (1972); Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co., 152 Colo. 567, 384 P.2d
96 (1963); Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (1955);
Koppel v. City of Fairway, 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962); Allen v. Coffel,
488 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182, alf'd, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954),
noted in 52 MICH. L. REV. 1071 (1954).
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stances, non-residents
should be allowed standing to challenge
94
ordinances.
these
So that the judiciary is better able to solve the problem of
inadequate procedural standards in hearings before local zoning
authorities, it is necessary that the courts have the opportunity to
review adequately decisions by those authorities. Recognizing
this necessity, some courts have developed more realistic, clearcut tests for determining whether an action of a legislative body
is an "unreviewable" legislative act or an administrative act which
could be reviewed.9 5 For example, in Donnelly v. City of Fairview Park the court found that if an action by a legislative body
creates a law, then that action is legislative; whereas, if the action
merely consists of executing a law, then the action is administrative.9 6 By fashioning such tests, these courts have been able to
tailor the scope of their review in order to control more effectively
abuses in the land-use regulatory process.
Finally, a major break with the past occurred when the
Washington Supreme Court created the "appearance of fairness"
rule. 97 This rule grew out of a need to control procedural abuses
before zoning authorities at the local level. Briefly stated, the
rule requires that not only shall all land-use regulatory proceedings be fair, but that they also appear to be fair to all parties involved.98 It was on this series of Washington cases that the Oregon Supreme Court based its landmark decision in Fasano v.
Board of County Commissioners of Washington County.99
94. See, e.g., Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 161 (1963); Comment, Extending
Standing to Nonresidents, A Response to the Exclusionary Effects of Zoning
Fragmentation, 24 VAND. L. REV. 341 (1971); Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond
Municipal Borders, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107, 121-24.
95. See, e.g., Donnelly v. City of Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St. 2d 1, 233 N.E.2d
500 (1968).
96. Id. at -, 233 N.E.2d at 502.
97. See Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972);
Anderson v. Island County, 81 Wash. 2d 312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972); Buell v.
Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972); Chrobuck v. Snohomish
County, 75 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971); Smith v. Skagit County, 7.5
Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969). In Glaspey & Sons, Inc. v. Conrad, 83
Wash. 2d 707, 521 P.2d 1173 (1974), the Washington Supreme Court extended
by doctrine the "appearance of fairness" rule to cover the legislative act of adoption of a zoning ordinance.
98. In Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 733, 453 P.2d 832, 842
(1969), the court said:
The public hearings, therefore, must not only be fairly undertaken
in a genuine effort to ascertain the wiser legislative course to pursue,
but must also appear to be done for that purpose. In short, when the
law which calls for public hearings gives the public not only the right
to attend but the right to be heard as well, the hearings must not only
be fair but must appear to be so. It is a situation where appearances
are quite as important as substance. (Emphasis in original).
99. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
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THE QUASI-JUDICIAL FORM RECONSIDERED-FASANO
v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF WASHINGTON COUNTY

In 1970, AGS Development Co., the owner of thirty-two
acres of land which was zoned R-7 (Single Family Residential)
applied for and received from the Washington County Board of
County Commissioners, a rezoning of the property to P-R
(Planned Residential). This zone change would have allowed for
the construction of a mobile home park on the thirty-two acres
of suburban land just outside Portland, Oregon. Upon petition
from neighboring property owners 'the trial court examined the
Board's decision by writ of review, 10 0 and used recent Oregon
precedent utilizing the "change or mistake" rule' 01 ,to overturn the
decision. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, 0 2 and on January 4, 1972, the Oregon Supreme Court granted review.' 03
In its consideration of the case, the state supreme court decided to reconsider the entire nature of the land-use regulatory
process, since the past record of the court was conspicuously inconsistent on this issue.' 04 After hearing arguments on March
1, 1972, the court ordered additional arguments on certain issues,
among which were:
If the "Comprehensive Plan" (as distinct from zoning)
must be followed by the Board of Commissioners in [rezoning],
a. What minimal procedural requirements are necessary
to assure a meaningful record on appeal?
c. How specific must the Board's findings be to provide
an adequate basis for judicial review?
d. Does the Board or the complaining property owner
issue of comowner have the burden of proof on the
10 5
pliance with the Comprehensive Plan?
In rendering its decision in Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of Washington County,10 6 the court characterized the
issues as follows:
100. The writ of review is the statutory derivative of common-law certiorari
in Oregon. ORE. REV. STAT. § 34.010 (1974).
101. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra, for an explanation of the
"change or mistake" rule.
102. 7 Ore. App. 176, 489 P.2d 693 (1971).
103. Review of matters within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is not
a matter of right. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 2.510-.520 (1974).
104. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs of Wash. County, 264 Ore. at 579,
507 P.2d at 26. The briefs of amicus curiae, Association of Oregon Counties,
League of Oregon Cities and Oregon Chapter of the American Institute of Planners stressed past inconsistencies (on file with the author).
105. Letter from Clerk of Oregon Supreme Court to Counsel, Sept. 18, 1972
(on file with the author).
106. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
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We granted review in this case to consider the questions
-by what standards does a county commissioner exercise his
authority in zoning matters; who has the burden of meeting
those standards when a request for change of zone is made;
and what is the scope of court review of such actions? 10 7
To define the proper scope of review, 'the court first determined whether the zoning decision by the county board was
"legislative" or "administrative." After reviewing its previous desions involving the characterization of zoning actions' 018 and after
considering the nature of various local zoning actions, the court
concluded that it "would be ignoring reality to rigidly view all zoning decisions by local governing bodies as legislative acts to be
accorded a full presumption of validity . . . ."109 The court
found that ordinances which state general policies without regard
to a specific piece of property usually are legislative acts," 0
whereas a determination of whether the permissible use of a
specific piece of property should be changed is usually a judicial
act."' Thus, the court held that the small-tract zoning change
effected by the county board in Fasano was administrative or
"quasi-judicial."' " 12
The court rejected the county's contention that the judicial
review of the zoning decision was limited to a determination of
whether the zoning was "arbitrary and capricious.'
Instead,
the court looked to the statutory requirement that zoning "carry
out" the comprehensive plan,"' and determined that a zoning
change would be upheld only if it was shown that the change was
in conformance with the comprehensive plan."' As there was
no showing that the rezoning was in 'accord with the plan, 'the Fasano court reversed the board's decision."16
Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court's denomination of small
107. Id. at 579, .507 P.2d at 25.
108. The court noted that in Smith v. County of Washington, 241 Ore. 380,
406 P.2d 545 (1965), it had characterized small tract rezoning as "legislative,"
while in Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, 330 P.2d 5, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 359 U.S. 436 (1959), it had characterized denial of a
use permit as an "administrative" act. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs of
Wash. County, 264 Ore. 574, 584, 507 P.2d 23, 26.
109. 264 Ore. at 580, 507 P.2d at 26 (1973).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 581, 507 P.2d at 26.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 581, 507 P.2d at 27.
114. ORE. REV. STAT. § 215.110(l) (1974).
115. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). The court found that the burden of
demonstrating conformity to the comprehensive plan increased as the intensity of
the proposed use increased over that of existing uses. That burden included demonstrating a public need for the proposed use and that the need was best satisfied
by the proposal. Id. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29.
116. ld. at 589, 507 P.2d at 30.
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tract zoning changes as administrative, "quasi-judicial" acts resulted in a broader scope of judicial review over such changes and
necessitated certain procedural reforms:
Parties at the hearing before the county governing body
are entitled to an opportunity to be heard, to an opportunity
to present and rebut evidence, to a tribunal which is impartial
in the matter-i.e., having had no pre-hearing or ex parte
issue-and to a record
contacts concerning the question at 117
executed.
findings
adequate
made and
A.

Effects of Fasano

In order to appreciate the significance of the Fasano decision, an analysis of its impact on the land use regulatory process
is necessary.
The burden of proof. As discussed earlier, a legislative act
is not susceptible to judicial attack on the sole ground that there
was an inadequate showing at the local level of the propriety of
such an action."" By contrast the Fasano court's adoption of 'the
quasi-judicial model for some land-use decisions requires that certain land-use hearings be "mini-trials" at which the petitioner
must convince the hearing officer or body that the requested accomprehensive plan or statutory
tion meets either the relevant
19
standards for such changes."
In Fasano the court also developed the notion of a "graduated burden of proof." Under this concept the "more drastic the
[requested] change, the greater will be the burden of showing
that the [change] is in conformance with the comprehensive
plan . . .20
Notice and opportunity to be heard. The Fasano decision

effects no drastic change in the requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard in hearings before local zoning authorities.
The traditional due process requirements of both notice and oprequisites of "legislative" as
portunity to be heard were already
12
well as "quasi-judicial" hearings.

1

117. Id., citing Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or
Quasi-JudicialAction, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130 (1972).
118. See, e.g., Kozesnick v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d
1 (1957).
119. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 6.05 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIS], which speaks of the "threshold of a new era" in which the courts
will require administrative agencies to promulgate standards against which their
actions can be measured.
120. 264 Ore. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29. This rationale is good only for "upzoning" (that is, zoning which effects an increase in density or intensity of use).
121. ANDERSON, supra note 2, at §§ 4.14, 4.16; DAVIS, supra note 119, at
§ 7.03.
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Impartial tribunal. No aspect of the administrative process

runs so counter to traditional notions of land-use regulation as
does the idea of limiting contacts between parties and members

of the zoning authority prior to a quasi-judicial hearing. In Ore-

gon, the Fasano decision has been extended by legislation which
creates conflicts of interest standards for planning commission
1 22
members.
The standards in this area parallel those used in the legal
community which place restrictions on conversation between a
judge and parties, or their attorneys, on a matter upon which the
judge must pass. 123 The Oregon rule prohibiting such contacts
may not be entirely workable because it is improbable that a per-

son in political office, such as a city council member, could avoid

being approached and influenced by a constituent. Nevertheless,
the rule could be modified to accomodate these realities of local
government practice. 2 4
Opportunity to present and rebut evidence. By virtue of
the trial-like hearing required under 'the quasi-judicial model
adopted by Fasano,'2 5 it is in the evidentiary area that the model
is most significant. The traditional land-use hearing has long
been marked with irrelevancies, exaggerations and crowd-pleasing

antics on either side of the rostrum.126 With the use of a trial-

type procedure, especially if the administration of an oath is required, 27 the incidence of "stretching the truth" will be diminished.

The issue of cross-examination is problematical.

28

Indeed,

122. See ORE. REV. STAT. § 215.035 (1974) (referring to county planning
commission members) and § 227.035 (1974) (referring to city planning commission members. The identical text of the statutes explains the standards as follows:
A member of a planning commission shall not participate in any
commission proceeding in which any of the following has a direct or
substantial interest: the member or his spouse, brother, sister, child, parent, father-in-law, mother-in-law, partner, any business in which he is
then serving or has served within the previous two years or any business
with which he is negotiating for or has an arrangement or understanding
concerning prospective partnership or employment.

Any actual or po-

tential interest shall be disclosed at the meeting of the commission where
the action is taken.
123. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, Judicial Canon no.
17, at 49 (1957).
124. A more effective practice may require full disclosure at the time of hearing and inquiry by all parties to determine the nature and weight of their contacts.
125. 264 Ore. at 589, 507 P.2d at 30 (1973).
126.

BABcOcK, supra note 47.

127. Dietrich v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 293 A.2d 470
(D.C. App. 1972) (In this case, the court found that the hearing was not in conformity with the requirements for contested cases because of a failure to swear
in the witnesses).
128. DAVIS, supra note 119, at § 14, 10. See also Northampton Corp. v.
Prince George's County, 21 Md. App. 625, 321 A.2d 204 (1974).
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it is a right which must not be disregarded in a quasi-judicial proceeding. 12 9 However, the multiplicity of parties and the possibilities of abuse present obvious difficulties. These problems
could most easily be avoided by allowing an individual a degree of
procedural rights based on the extent of his interest in the outcome of the hearings. Thus, while all would be allowed to exerthose accorded
cise their right to "testify" at land-use hearings, 3only
"party" status should be able to cross-examine.1 0
The standards for presentation of evidence should not differ
from those used in other administrative hearings-that is, the
rules should be less restrictive than those utilized in jury trials and
sufficiently liberal to accord with the general informality of administrative hearings.' 3
Another practical problem arises: how do the triers of fact
limit irrelevant or cumulative testimony? The vesting of discretionary power in the hearing officer or body would seem to be
has proved
the best solution to this problem. Such an approach
32
successful in other administrative proceedings.1
The record. The possibility that a zoning decision will be
subject to judicial review should impel the hearing officer or body
to make an adequate record for review. Basic to the notion of
due process and effective judicial review is a record which may
be reviewed for sufficiency of evidence and absence of procedural
error. Use of a court reporter or tape machine is preferable to
hand-taken minutes-especially ir view of the decided judicial
preference for verbatim transcripts. 3 3 All exhibits should be systematically marked and their use (for example, pointing to maps)
should appear clearly in the record.
129. Shellbume, Inc. v. Conner, 269 A.2d 409 (Del. Ch. 1970), rev'd, 281
A.2d 608 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1971); Dietrich v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 293 A.2d 470 (D.C. App. 1972); Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 524 P.2d
84 (Hawaii 1974); Annot. 27 A.L.R.3d 1304 (1969).
130. In Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 75 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 496
(1971), a case relied upon by the Oregon Supreme Court in Fasano, the Washington Court recognized that such cross-examination may be limited within reason
to relevant issues.
131. In DAVIS supra note 119, at §§ 14.01-.06, the author comments that:

The direction of movement on evidence problems throughout the legal system, in the judicial process as well as in the administrative process, is toward (1) replacing rules with discretion, (2) admitting all evidence that seems to the presiding officer relevant and useful, and (3)
relying upon 'that kind of evidence on which responsible persons are ac-

customed to rely in serious affairs'.
132. Id.
133. Printzas v. Borough of Norristown, 10 Pa. Cmwlth. 482, 313 A.2d 781
In West
(1973); Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wash. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973).
v. City of Astoria, 524 P.2d 1216 (Ore. App. 1974), the Oregon Court of Appeals

held that two full hearings on the same application by an agency need not be
held so long as the record of the first hearing is adequate.
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As discussed earlier, the use of specific findings, accompanying even "legislative" decisions, has been a requirement of many
courts.'
Such a requirement both insures due process to all parties and better enables the court to review the decision of the
land-use agency below. The future of this requirement is not difficult to foresee-the decisions will turn not upon whether findings
were made, but on whether -those findings were adequate.1 5
With the introduction of these procedural safeguards, the rights
of all parties are accorded greater protection and there is substantially less likelihood that land-use decisions will be arbitrary.
IV.

MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE

Responding in part to the concern over the adequacy of the
procedures employed in the land-use regulatory process, the American Law Institute has developed "A Model Land Development
Code."' 3 6 The Model Code has relied on the rationale of the
Fasano court as a basis for providing more effective substantive
judicial review over land use changes. The basic trend of land37
use law in this area is shown by the Code.
A.

The Legislative v. Quasi-JudicialDistinction

The Model Code adopts the distinction between "rulemaking" and "adjudication,"' 13 8 and seeks to attach different classes
of procedural rights to each, in accordance with its purpose of establishing,
a system of administrative and judicial review of local and
state land use decisions which encourages both effective
citizen participation and prompt resolution of disputes. 13 9
For example, the Code distinguishes a "general development permit," which issues as a matter of right, much as a building permit,
from a "special development permit,"'4 0 which issues only after
134. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra.

135. The Fasano case turned on the issue of the adequacy of the findings. See
Calton v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 252 Ind. 56, 245 N.E.2d 337 (1969); Barborne v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 107 R.I. 174, 264 A.2d 921 (1970); ANDERSON,
supra note 2, at § 16.43, 16.44. The Oregon Attorney General issued an opinion

which attempts to assist local governments in Oregon in the implementation of
Fasano (34 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 7062 (1974)).
136. MODEL CODE, supra note 30.

137. See MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at § 2-312, Note at 111-16.
138. Compare MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at § 1-201(13) with (14); compare § 2-303 with 2-304.
139. See MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at § 1-101(5).
140. Id. § 2-102. The Model Code provides that a local development ordinance may divide developments into four categories:
development which is permitted as of right ("general development"); development which may be permitted at the discretion of the Land Development Agency ("special development"); development which needs no
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notice, hearing and final order, using the quasi-judicial model.' 4 '
The hearing is before the local "land development agency," which

governing
body or a committee or officer of the
may be the local 14
2
local government.
The Model Code makes additional "legislative"-"adjudicative" distinctions. The Code treats the adoption of local and state
land development plans, 4 ' and the application of those plans to
large areas, as legislative acts.'
Decisions relating to specific
pieces of property, however, are deemed to be 'adjudicative in

nature. 4 5 In all cases, there are provisions for public notice 4 '
and the requirement that specific procedures be followed.' 4 7
B.

Legislative and Adjudicative Procedures

Under the Model Code, procedures employed in rulemaking
and adjudicative procedures differ sharply. Rulemaking requires

notice and a hearing except in an emergency.' 48 The "land development agency" is permitted to render a declaratory order, interpreting the local regulations -after notice and hearing. In its
order, the agency specifies the special development that it can and
will permit on a particular parcel of land. This order binds the
permit but which must comply with the general development regulations; and development exempt from the regulations of the ordinance.
Id. § 2-101, Note, at 38. The notice requirements of the Code are specific and
meant to apply on a statewide basis. § § 1-201(11) and (12) define a "newspaper
general circulation" and the manner of giving notice by mail, while § 2-304
(2) provides for the manner of giving notice to certain parties in adjudicative
hearings.
141. See MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at H9 2-102 and 2-201(1) and (2)
which describe certain situations in which special development permits may be issued only after notice and hearing.
142. See MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at § 1-201(7), 2-102, 2-301, at 8285.
143. See MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at H9 3-106, 8-401, 8-405.
144. See MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at § 2-101(2) which refers to the
ordinance-making process, in determining what areas or activities are encompassed
in the "special development permit" process and 8-301 to 8-303, referring to the
adoption of a state official map.
145. See MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at §§ 2-304 (special development permit issued only after quasi-judicial procedures), 7-501 to 7-504 (quasi-judicial
appeals hearing procedure before State Land Adjudicatory Board).
146. Id. § 8-208 (weekly notice of certain land development proposals); art.
11 (relating to filing of notices).
147. Id. § 11-101 provides that local ordinances, rules and orders will not be
effective unless the requirements of the Code for filing have been completed.
Generally, the Code requires that an order, rule or ordinance be filed in "the public office where a deed of the land involved in the order, rule or ordinance would
be recorded." Id. § 11-102. It should be noted that ordinances, rules and orders
are subject to invalidation if procedural requirements are met. id. at § 9-109(1)

(c).
148.
ings).

Id. H9 2-303, 2-305 (which set out procedures for legislative type hear-
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local government for one year. 149 Adoption of general ordinances relating to land use follows local ordinance-making procedures. 5 ° Amendments to ordinances, however, cannot be
adopted without first being transmitted to the land development

agency, for comments and recommendations.' 5 ' This requirement frustrates efforts to pass "quickie" amendments.
With regard to adjudication, the Model Code encourages the
52
land development agency to adopt its own rules of procedure,

but certain requirements for the conduct of "administrative hearings" are set forth in the Code. These requirements are: the
giving of notice, the appointment of a presiding officer, providing
for appearances of record, the giving of "party" status to certain
individuals, the administration of oaths and issuance of subpoenas,
presentation of evidence, cross-examination and rebuttal, adequate
hearing record, prohibitions on ex parte communications, a review
of the proposed decision by the parties if the full land development

agency issuing the same was not present at the hearing, a requirement that the decision be based on the'hearing record, and written
findings of fact and conclusions of law.'
The local hearing may be combined with other hearings if
multiple permits are involved.'
Any order granting a special
development permit must be published.' 5 If the permit request
is denied, the applicant must be given the reasons therefor' 5 6
57
and be barred from making a similar application for one year.
Finally, small-ract changes (denominated "special amendments")
149. Id. § 2-308.
150. Id. § 2-310.
151. Id. § 2-311. This section requires referral to the Land Development
Agency for comments. Before adoption the comments of the agency must have
been available to the public or twelve weeks must have elapsed since the transmission of the proposed amendment to the agency. The Land Development Agency
must hold a legislative-type hearing on the proposal, which itself requires four
weeks notice under § 2-305.
152. Id. § 2-302(2). In Oregon the adoption of such rules is mandatory for
counties and cities in quasi-judicial matters. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 215.412, 227.170
(1974).

153. MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at § 2-304. In addition, the Code gives
standing to "qualified" neighborhood organizations, which meet the standards prescribed in § 2-307. The State Land Planning Agency may grant standing in local
adjudicatory hearings, by rule promulgated under § 8-204. However, if one did
not participate in an adjudicatory hearing due to lack of notice, § 9-103 (4) allows
the court to grant standing to test a final order. Finally, § 9-103(5) allows one
to pursue review of an order if he can show that he has a significant interest
which was not adequately represented.
154. Id. § 2-402.
155. Id. § 2-306(2).
156. Id.
157. Id. § 2-306(3). A similar 6-month rule prevails in Oregon. See ORE.
REv. STATS. §§ 215.416(4), 227.175(4) (1974).
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are severely restricted to prevent abuse.1 5
C.

Other Rulemaking and Adjudicative Exercises

Even outside the local-general-ordinance-versus-special-amendment dichotomy, the Model Code distinguishes the two
functions. For example, the passage of an ordinance which discontinues certain classes of land uses, either generally or in specias to specific
fied areas, is a legislative act 15 but its enforcement
16
persons or properties is an adjudicative act.'
A similar distinction is drawn in Article 5 with regard to actions relating to the acquisition and disposition of land. 16 1 While
the power to condemn usually is seen as a legislative act,' 62 the
Code provides for a proceeding, which requires notice, hearing

may
and findings, through which the state land planning agency
63

condemn private land for private "large scale development."'
Further, the state land planning agency may designate certain geographical areas as ',areas of critical state concern,"' 4 and
thereby restrict development in these areas.'65 The state agency
also has the power to define categories of development which are

likely to present issues of regional or state significance.166

How-

ever, once this agency has passed regulations governing develop-

focuses on quasi-judicial approval of individual
ment, the process
6 7
applications.
158. MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at § 2-312. This section follows the rule
in Fasano. Id., Note, at 112. The "special amendment" is described as an
amendment whose effect is limited to a single parcel or several parcels in related
ownership, or which changes the regulations of an area of 50 acres or less, or
wherein development is permitted only after approval of the local governing body.
Prior to the adoption of a special amendment, the Land Development Agency is
to hold a hearing and make findings and recommendations. Id.
159. The discontinuance of disfavored land uses is initiated by rule. See

supra note 30, at H§ 4-101, 4-102.
160. See MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at H§ 4-201, 4-202.

MODEL CODE,

161. Id., art. 5.
162. See MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at H8 5-301, 5-302.
163. This legislative characterization appears to be continued in the Model
Code. See MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at § 5-203, 5-204. The process by
which land is acquired for private development by the State Land Planning
Agency results in an order after an adjudicative hearing.
164. See MODEL CODE,supra note 30, at § 7-201, Note at 295-96, for examples
of areas to which the designation "Area of Critical State Concern" might be applied.
165. Id. § 7-202.
166. This is also accomplished by a "rule." Id. § 7-301(1).
167. The result of designating an area of activity of state or regional concern
is to add substantive, rather than procedural, requirements to land use regulation.
Individual applications would still be treated in an adjudicative setting. See
MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at H§ 7-207(1), (3); 7-303(2); 7-304. See also the
procedures for appeals of "orders" to the State Land Adjudicatory Board. Id.
§§ 7-501 to 7-504.
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Finally, the state land planning agency may adopt, by rule,
an official map designating future land acquisitions 1 68 and a state or
regional land development plan' 69 for all legislative activities.
Most significantly, in all of the above provisions, the Model
Code has carefully distinguished between the rulemaking and the
,adjudicative processes. 7 ° Similarly, as the processes differ so do
the standards of judicial review. In all cases, however, the Code
encourages the judiciary to enforce strict procedural requirements.' 7 ' The distinctions made by the Code between legislative and adjudicative actions were carefully considered by the
drafters and deserve recognition in the light of their functional
approach.
V.

DEMOCRATIC PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

While the courts, as in Fasano, have often found it necessary
to lead the way, the judiciary cannot hope to solve the multifarious problems relating to procedures to be employed before landuse regulatory bodies. Courts by their nature act on a case-bycase basis and irn a negativo manner, striking down decisions
which fail to meet the standard of due process regarding the legislative or quasi-judicial act.
The solution to the problem lies in legislative action.' 72 The
legislatures of the several states must assert their concern, and,
just as they provided for appropriate procedures in the standard
acts of the twenties, so they must provide for appropriate procedures in the seventies. There are various procedural reforms
which would produce positive effects on public confidence in
land-use decision making.
A.

Use of a Hearing Officer
Perhaps the most common complaint of planners, planning
commissions and local governing bodies with regard to land-use
planning is that their attention is constantly given to zoning disputes rather than planning.' 3 To alleviate this problem a hearing
168. Id. § 8-303.
169. Id. §§ 8-401 to 8-405.

170. Compare the different criteria for review of adjudicatory acts under
supra note 30, at § 9-103 with the criteria listed for the review
of rulemaking acts under MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at § 9-104.
171. MODEL CODE supra note 30, at § 9-109(1)(c).
MODEL CODE,

172. Justice Bryson's special concurrence in Fasano points out that while the

court can formulate rules, it cannot provide a panacea:
It is solely within the domain of the legislative branch of government to devise a new and simplified statutory procedure to expedite finality of decision.
Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 590, 507 P.2d 23, 31 (1973).
173. See B~d3cocK, supra note 47, at 62-64.
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officer could be appointed to hear quasi-judicial "contested cases"
and render opinions. 174 Such a system is already in operation in
Cincinnati, Ohio, and Montgomery County, Maryland. 175 The
use of hearing officers has proved successful in Washington, 76 and
has been adopted on a permissive basis in Oregon.17 7 The opinion of the hearing officer may be advisory only, as proposed to

the Washington Legislature, 78 or it may be deemed a binding decision subject to an appeal. 17 In either case, any decision subsequent to that of the hearing officer would be based solely on
the record before the hearing officer so that only one public hearing would be required on each application.
B.

Standing Without Economic Injury

No issue in land-use regulation is so vexing as that of standing. In land-use law, a party usually is found to have standing
where he has an economic interest in the outcome of the litigation' 80 or where the outcome might result in an infringement of
There is some evidence that the fedhis "fundamental rights."''

eral courts are modifying their concept of standing,' 8 2 but legisla-

tion is probably the more appropriate solution.
In response to this issue, (the Model Code provides that a

party may have standing in two instances without any showing of
economic injury or threat to a fundamental right. Under the
Code a "qualified" neighborhood organization' s3 isgiven auto174. See MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at § 2-301, and Note, at 82-85.
175. Id. The Maryland Court of Appeals allowed the use of a hearings officer who submitted findings and recommendations to a county governing body
but who did not make the final decision in a contested case. Northampton Corp.
v. Prince George's County, 21 Md. App. 625, 321 A.2d 204 (1974).
176. Wash. H.B., 791, Reg. Sess. (1973). But see D. Capps, Hearings Examiners in the Zoning and Planning Process (concerning the successful use of hearings officers in King County, Washington) (on file with the author).
177. ORE REV. STATS. §§ 215.402-422 (1974), relating to county planning and
ORE. REV. STATS.

178.

§§ 227.160-.180 (1974), relating to city planning.

Wash. H.B. 791, Reg. Sess. (1973).

179. Id.
180. See Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 547-49, 492 P.2d 1137,
1140-42, 99 Cal Rptr. 745, 748-50 (1972); see generally periodicals cited in notes
92, 94 and accompanying text supra.
181. See Shannon v. United States Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d
809, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1970); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d
920, 927 (2d Cir. 1968).
182. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-39 (1972); Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1968).
183. MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at § 2-307 provides that the local Land Development Agency shall issue an order designating a neighborhood organization
as qualified under the Code if: 1) the organization has filed an application showing its boundaries, and the names of its officers and directors; 2) the organization
represents more than half of the adults residing within its boundaries; 3) the organization has at least 50 members; 4) at least 50% of the area within its bound-
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matic standing. In addition the Code gives the state land planning agency the power to grant automatic standing in local decisions through its rulemaking power.1 84
C.

Encouragingan Extensive DeliberativeProcess

The failure of the courts to break down the legislative barrier
to examination of the rationale behind small tract zoning changes
has been mitigated in many states by the requirement of an Environmental Impact Statement for zoning changes which are "major
actions affecting the environment."' 8
Use of the Statement encourages a thorough consideration of specific proposals relating
to alternative sites, a "no-build" alternative and means for lessening the impact of the proposal. 186
The extension of this deliberative process to land-use regulation now requires regulatory agencies to review at great length
the effects of decisions which heretofore have been undertaken
without careful consideration. Social and economic factors, as
well as environmental impacts, are considered in land-use regulation, so that the Environmental Impact Statement analogy is not
stretched too thinly by application to land use regulations.
D.

State and Regional Land Use Planning

The Euclidean model' 87 of complete delegation of land-use
powers to local government, has given land-use controls a parochial character. In the past two decades, however, there has been
a trend away from complete delegation of land-use powers to
municipalities and toward a regional or statewide approach. 188 In
California, under the California Shorelines Conservation Act, 89
aries is developed for residential use; and, 5) membership in the organization
is
Such an organization
be entitled to maintain a class action on an adverse decision at less cost would
to the
open to all registered voters within its boundaries.

individual resident.
184. See MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at §§ 2-304; 2-307; 8-204; 9-103(4),

(5).

185. See Yost, NEPA's Progeny: State Environmental Policy Acts,
3 ENvi50090, 50092-93 (1973); see also CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21000

RONMENTAL REP.

et seq. (West Supp. 1974); 14 CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 14, § 851 (1973); SAN JOSE
CAL. Mrtm. CODE art. XX (1974); see also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823,
830-35 (1972).
186. 'See, e.g., CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21100(c) (West Supp. 1974).
187. The Euclidean model refers to the type of zoning which was the subject
of litigation in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
188. MODEL CODE, supra note 30, art. VII, Commentary at 281; F. BossELMAN

& D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (Council
on
Environmental Quality 1971).
189. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27000-650 (West Supp. 1974), creating
the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission and providing for regional coastal
zone conservation commissions.
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and by statute in Vermont 90° and Maine, 9 ' state agencies have
been created with the power to make land-use decisions. Proare found in the
cedures which these state agencies are to follow
92
administrative procedures act of each state.'
In Oregon, an appeal from a local land-use decision may be
taken to the State Land Conservation and Development Commis-

sion in certain limited situations. 9 Florida follows 'the Model
Code provision which allows for appeals from local decisions con94
cerning development having regional significance.

In Mas-

sachusetts, an appeal from the decision of a local governing body
to exclude low or moderate income housing is available.' 95
E.

Use of the State Administrative ProceduresAct

Perhaps the most likely trend to emerge from recharacterizing individual tract reclassifications as quasi-judicial is increased
state legislative intervention into the procedural field. Although

replacing the usual atmosphere of exaggeration and crowd pleas-

ing,' 96 prevalent at public hearings, with a balanced adjudicative
19 7

approach will be demanding in terms of money and expertise,

the adoption of a state administrative procedures act would guard

against distortion of the merits often occasioned by loose proce190. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1.51-6001 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
191. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 239-4511 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
192. See In re Preseault, 130 Vt. 343, 292 A.2d 832 (1972), detailing the procedures in Vermont whereby the petitioners filed an application with the District
Environmental Commission, the application was published providing requisite notice, hearings were held, the permit was denied, an appeal was taken to the State
Environmental Board and an appeal was then taken to the Vermont Supreme
Court. See also Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 524 P.2d 84 (Hawaii 1974).
193. ORa. REV. STAT. §§ 197.300-.315 (1974) providing for review upon petition by a county governing body of a comprehensive plan provision or ordinance
or regulation not in conformity with adopted state planning goals; or upon petition
by a city or county governing body of an action taken by another governmental
agency not in conformity with such goals; or upon petition by a governmental
agency of a county action not in accordance with the special role given counties
(to review and coordinate plans); or petition by any "person or persons whose
interests are substantially affected" by a plan or ordinance provision in violation
of the aforesaid goals. Review is coordinated by the Land Conservation Development Commission, a state administrative body.
194. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.02(2) (Supp. 1974); see Finnell, Saving Paradise:
The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, 1973
URBAN L. ANNUAL 103, 119.
195. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40B § 22 (1973); see Board of Appeals of
Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm'n, 294 N.E.2d 393, 401, 402 (Mass. 1974);
Note, The Massachusetts Zoning Appeals Law: First Breach on the Exclusionary
Wall, 54 B.U.L. REv. 37, 48, 49, (1974).
196. See Note, The Ad Hominem Element in the Treatment of Zoning Problems, 109 U.PA. L. REv. 992 (1961).
197. A variation of the Federal Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551
et seq. (1970), is used, however, in zoning decisions in the District of Columbia.
Dietrich v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 293 A.2d 470, 472 (D.C. App. 1972).
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dure. 19' 8 Indeed, as one commentator urges, there should be less
emphasis or substantive standards, which have often been too
broad to be of any use, and more concern with procedural safe1 99
guards.
F. Defining the Burden of Proof
Finally, a clear distinction, both at the hearing level and on
review, should be made between the burden of persuasion (which
remains upon the 'applicant throughout the hearing) and the burden of proof (which may shift back and forth between the parties
during the course of the hearing).2'
With such a distinction the
legislature could clarify what evidence the hearings body, and ultimately the courts, should require from parties at the lowest level
of a contested case. If the courts will allow small-tract changes
to be treated as contested cases under general principles of administrative law, in lieu of attempting to retry the matter, and
insist upon adequate procedural safeguards, the emphasis at hearings will be the land-use matters at issue, rather than the personalities involved.
CONCLUSION

Procedural reforms in hearings before local zoning authorities are long overdue. An individual whose property might be
affected by a proposed rezoning can hope to have a fair hearing
before the local governing body only if he is afforded the protections of procedural due process. Courts and legislatures have been
slow to require these procedural reforms at the local level.
Fasano and the Model Code, however, give new hope for relief
from this traditional absence of procedural standards.
Before we can expect the judiciary to require that proper
procedural standards be followed at the local level, however, the
courts must first be encouraged to abandon their customary, arbitrary classification of local land-use decisions as "legislative." Out
of necessity, many courts already have made inroads into the
previously "unreviewable" local legislative field, and by doing so
have been able to establish procedural standards for actions traditionally deemed "legislative." In addition, Fasanoand the Model
Code mark widely-heralded departures from the traditional treat198.

Lundberg, Land Use Planning and the Montana Legislature: An Over-

view for 1973, 35 MONT. L. REv. 38, 39 (1974).
199.

Mandelker, supra note 37, at 80-82; see generally Roberts, The Demise

of Property Law, 57

CORNELL

L. REV. 1, 43 (1971).

200. Bronstein & Erickson, Zoning Amendments in Michigan-Two Recent

Developments, 50 J.

URBAN

L. 729, 742 (1973).

80
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ment of local land-use actions. Both the Code and Fasano provide
examples to be followed by legislatures and other courts. Only
by re-evaluating the function of various local actions, as did the
court in Fasano and the draftsmen of the Model Code, will we be
able to obtain the needed procedural reforms in land-use hearings
before local governing bodies.

